Supply Side Management of Water Crisis in Pakistan: Post # 23

 Agreed and Efficient Supply Side Water management:   

International literature provides the following definition of Supply-Side Water management: “Supply side management means developing new water sources, building additional water storage facilities, diverting water from one basin to another, or treating water that might not otherwise be potable (e.g. desalinization).” Pakistan can perhaps be considered a country developed in surface and groundwater infrastructure, except for the additional need of storage facilities to tackle seasonal excessive unevenness in river flows and institutional arrangements for proper surface and groundwater management. At present, Pakistan is utilizing almost 75% of renewable water resources, rendering it to be a severely water stressed country compared to many other arid and semi-arid countries.

According to some reports, the total groundwater potential of Pakistan is around 66.8 MAF (82.4 BCM). At a time when there were 575,197 tube-wells installed, it was estimated that about 62 % of total potential was being exploited. With the tube-well population almost doubling, the residual potential for groundwater extraction is hardly of any significance; rather, it is possible that many areas have already started over-extraction of groundwater making groundwater mining a common practice.

Like in many relatively more developed countries, we can treat wastewater (sewage plus industrial wastewater) for its reuse in agriculture and / forestry. Based on an estimate of wastewater from important cities of Pakistan, the current quantity generated is about 2.3 BCM. At present, only one percent is treated and the rest is either used for growing vegetables within peri-urban areas and / or disposed off into the adjacent rivers and canals. In either case, such practices are a growing health hazard. Although the current status of wastewater is not that large when we compare it with surface and groundwater availability, it is still large enough to get treated and used for plantation like promoting forestry in this country.

Another source worth considering is that of rain water harvesting. Reports suggest that Pakistan has a total potential of rain water harvesting of 8.5 BCM (6.9 MAF), but not more than 0.12 BCM (0.1 MAF) is being availed at this time. The major source for rainwater harvesting being used in Pakistan is mainly small and mini dams. Only in the Pothwar area is there a potential of 400 small dams and around 8000 mini dams. At present, however, only 30 small dams and 405 mini dams are being built in this area.  As construction of such small and mini dams are mostly built for meeting local water needs, they are not controversial and water resource development using these small and / mini dams can be pursued without going through many of the socio-political road blocks.

However, the most significant contributor towards finding a way-out for meeting the water crisis in this country is increasing water storage capacity at a very fast track. Unfortunately, we as a nation are in bind: On one hand, without building new dams for storing Indus River supplies, we have no future for our agriculture based economy; and on the other hand, without securing consensus among all four provinces for building new dams, we fear to run a risk of endangering our federation of four provinces. Parallel to this statement, I just cannot stop myself saying that not trying to find alternatives and creative ways and means to develop water storages is a definite sign of no future of any kind for Pakistan.

It is interesting to note that the Colorado River has an annual yield of only 15 BCM (12 MAF), while its storage along the river is approximately 80.2 BCM (65 MAF)—almost five folds the annual yield. Yet, even divided our Indus River System delivers around 179 BCM (145 MAF) to Pakistan, but our water storage is barely 15 BCM (12 MAF) with an equivalent number of dams. Compared to other similar international river/water storage projects, our performance is simply a huge embarrassment to say the least. Why can’t we have water reservoirs with a total capacity of 900 BCM at a ratio similar to that of the storage ratio of the Colorado River instead of the paltry 15 BCM?

According to a cliché, I strongly believe: “Yes, we can.”  Of course, I am not trying to suggest that there is a magical way-out for developing a consensus to build dams across Indus or its other main tributaries; rather, under the prevailing political environment, it would be very difficult to achieve such a breakthrough. However, things are not as gloomy as they are painted or made to appear. Quite to the contrary, there are already two important provisions in place to facilitate a significant alternative way-out of the bind we find ourselves in. Here, I am referring to the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 and the Water Apportionment Accord of 1991. If we decide not to build storages for irrigation across the Indus River or its main tributaries and instead devise a way-out based on the agreements referred to above, we have a win-win situation for all stakeholders in Pakistan.

To clarify, I have only said that we should no longer insist on building water storages for irrigation across the Indus River and / or its main tributaries. However, this does not stop us from having cascade run-of-the-river hydro-power dams or even more than that a hydraulic state to generate environmental-friendly and cheap electricity. With this rider, no sane person in the country will object as the energy dependency on imported fuel for producing many times more expensive power is suicidal for the economy in the short as well as in the longer run. As a matter fact, these imported fuel alternatives were promoted to avoid or side-track efforts focused on building large multi-purpose reservoirs across our main river system. Once that bone of contention is removed, developing cascades of run-of-the-river or even more than the run-of-the river dams should not cause any significant opposition anywhere in Pakistan.

However, more than hydro-power, people are concerned about the emerging threat to irrigated agriculture due to severe shortages of water when it is needed the most and the possibility of floods when its use is the least. This badly timed fluctuation of water supply can occur by design if India manipulates the supply via the dozens of dams it is planning and constructing on all of the three western rivers allocated to Pakistan  and by ignoring appropriate watershed management within its controlled region. Or, it can occur due to the on-going global climate change.

Yes, we can and we must work out joint projects and studies for effective watershed management both under Indian-control as well as those watershed regions that lie within Pakistan. We should also conduct research studies jointly with India to assess impacts of climatic change on our river flows and implement correct and proactive measures to deal with such potential changes.  In addition, we must be more aggressive in making use of all the mechanisms put in place under the Indus Water Treaty to ensure that the Treaty is implemented both in letter and spirit for the sake of the people of this region.

In the end, however, the real success of such efforts will depend significantly on the conditions we create in Pakistan to handle possible threats that disturb the timing and flow of river water (whether by the upper riparian region’s design or climate changes). In this context, after forgoing the option to build large reservoirs for irrigation on the Indus or its main tributaries, we are left with the alternative of allowing each province of Pakistan to take responsibility for storing its full or partial share as agreed in the Accord of 1991 off-channel storages.

In case of Khyber –Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab, both sides of the Indus River and Pothwar region can provide sites for off-channel water storages. Since Sindh and Baluchistan do not have such convenient off-channel storage sites, either they can have their own but paid storages say in Gilgit-Baltistan or jointly, based on agreed terms of reference, with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and / Punjab in Pothwar region. Because of the up-stream locations for off-channel sites, the present irrigation system can easily be connected with their respective canal system to augment flow during lean river flows. Since making use or storing water for its future use as per the Accord of 1991 is a provincial subject, provinces must be authorized to take the necessary steps in this direction.

This proposed alternative is a significant component of the way-out from the emerging severe water crisis in the country. In a way, this presents a win-win situation where the concerned parties can get out of their hardened positions to a way forward as it caters to the main concerns of different stakeholders:

Ø  Political stands of Sindh, Baluchistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa provinces are accommodated by agreeing not to build multi-purpose dams on the main Indus or its tributaries ;

Ø  Such an alternative will allow to build cascades of hydro-power dams on all main channels to generate cheap and environmentally friendly electricity;

Ø  Inter-provincial tensions over water distribution during high demand periods should dissipate as the quantity due within season will take precedent as compared to the weekly water distributions that are practiced at present;

Ø  Off-channel water storages in Pothwar area should provide convenient capacity to store flood water, under both natural as well as man-made scenarios, from all three western rivers in general and from the Jhelum and  Chenab in particular; and

Ø  This way-out helps to avoid blame games concerning water theft from being played out between provinces as it is based on agreed water shares as defined by the Water Apportionment Accord of 1991.

Such alternative storages are a must as they ensure readiness to face the emerging water crisis as well as a means to bypass the current standoff over building large dams on the Indus and its main tributaries. In view of the skewed nature of river flows, at present, our storage capacity is too limited. Based on 50% probability, flow data from 1937 to 1967 reveals that almost 85% (144.5 BCM or 117 MAF) of total annual flow (173 BCM or140 MAF) occurs only during Kharif or the summer season. In the absence of relevant data regarding the 2-3 months of Monsoon (15 June to 15 September), just to present a ground reality, we associate (based on IWMI’s data by Asim Rauf Khan, 1999) two-third or 96 BCM or 78 MAF flow during Monsoon.  Even if we deduct 15 BCM required to fill the existing three dams, we still need to handle the remaining 81 BCM (66 MAF). Where do we have the capacity to make use of this huge quantity of water, which is almost 47% of the total annual flow of the Indus System?

Here I expect many challenges like how is it that annual flows below Kotri are only around 43 BCM or 35 MAF? Of course, it is debatable but by the same token, someone else can question why the annual average of the Indus flow from 1922 to 1961 is reported to be about 115 BCM (93 MAF) and then downgraded to about 77 BCM (62.7 MAF) from 1985 to 1995? Did India divert the Indus flow to cause such a dramatic drop? Is there some explanation and account for 50 to 100% more quantity that every province is trying to push through their respective canal systems (based on data collected on three distributaries in Punjab, Sindh and NWFP in 1985 by a team of Colorado State University)? Of course, all such figures do not match up; either our flow measuring means are incorrect or there are some other hidden agendas that we do not understand. In any case, we need to move forward and let each province be responsible for its own due share to get out of this hypocritical game that takes us nowhere.

One question that I have never been able to understand is as follows: Why is it that the Colorado River System has an annual yield of around 12 MAF with its storage almost 5 times that of its annual flow, when the Indus System with its annual flow being 10 times more than that of the Colorado River is cursed to restrict its storage capacity to only 9-10% of its annual yield? After securing the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 and Water Apportionment Accord of 1991, it does not make any sense to let the future of our country be risked by not doing a doable task as has been demonstrated along the Colorado River under similar semi-arid and arid environmental conditions and with the same number of reservoirs. In view of the prevailing political logjam over constructing dams along our river system, I propose off-channel storages based on due shares of each province.

Do we have enough off-channel sites for such storages? Our hilly northern areas and plateau of Pothwar are ideally located options for such storages. Once people agree to seek the off-channel alternative, surveys and studies can be conducted to find appropriate off-channel dam sites. In view of the topography of the referred areas, there will be no dearth of such sites. For example, as shown in Figure3, in Pothwar Area, some surveys have already been conducted to pin-point some locations that are suitable to store flows from the Indus River as well as Jhelum River. In the case of Punjab, for explanation purposes only, 37% floodwater share amounts to 30 BCM or 24.5 MAF from all three western rivers.

Figure 3: Indus and Jhelum off-channel storage sites

Other provinces will construct their own storages to augment their water shortfalls during lean periods.  Since all provinces will keep on claiming their routine share to meet their crop needs, these excessive off-channel storages, after augmenting lean periods in each province, should keep on increasing till we’ll have enough stored amounts to bring additional areas under irrigation and face drought incidents without stealing water from other stakeholders.

This proposed alternative is a significant way-out from the self-imposed and self-destructive political bind for technical problem. Based on already signed agreements and water shares, without making any party lose face, we can move forward and start creating conditions in a proactive manner to face off the emerging severe and horrifying water crisis in this country. It is quite late, but still not too late to forget the past and starting finding a solution to the suicidal impasse that we find ourselves in.

Of course, this is just a dream at present but by accepting this way-out we will convert this dream into a shared vision of huge off-channel lakes and reservoirs, cascades of run-of-the –river, or more than run-of-the-river hydro-power dams, and consequently greener areas in the north and south of the country. We can have all this without any fear of Indian manipulation of timing and quantity of river flows or internal wrangling over the distribution of water. Strangely, it sounds too good to be true but if we have determination, drive and dedication to make things happen, there is nothing that cannot be accomplished. Moreover, what other alternative options do we have to follow or implement? I am afraid not many!!!