Nature of Water Crisis: Post # 21

A.   Nature of Water Crisis: 

Water crisis is a term that refers to the scarcity and quality of available water resources relative to human demand. The nature of water crisis is such that it can change from one context to the next. Observation of the following indicators signify a global water crisis (Wikipedia)[1]:

• Inadequate access to drinking water for 1.1 billion people;
• Inadequate access to water for sanitation and wastewater disposal for 2.5 billion people;
• Groundwater excessive use leading diminished agricultural yields;
• Overuse and pollution of water resources harming biodiversity; and
• Regional conflict over scarce water resources sometime resulting into warfare.

In order to standardize comparison between regions, an international indicator measuring the quantity of water available per year per person has been established to determine the emerging seriousness of the water crisis. A region is said to be water stressed if the per capita annual water availability ranges between 1000-2000 m³. The locality is facing a water scarcity situation if the amount of water drops below 1000 m³.

There are significant distortions found in the distribution of water across the globe (Amin Dadbhoy, 2003)[2]. On the one hand we find regions like Kuwait, Ghaza and UAE that experience water scarcity with annual per capita water availability averaging around 10 m³, 52 m³ and 58 m³, respectively. At the other extreme, there are regions abundant in water—for example, French Guiana (812,121 m³), Iceland (609, 319 m³), Guyana (316,689 m³), Surinam (292, 566 m³), Congo (275,679, m³), Canada (94,353 m³) and New Zealand (86,554 m³).

These wide disparities of water availability are a result of the geography and climate of the regions. With the oncoming climatic changes, humid regions are expected to receive even more rain and arid and semi-arid zones are predicted to see lesser and more erratic rainfall. According to one estimate, climatic change may lead to an additional 20% scarcity in water in drought-prone areas (M. Amin Dadabhoy, 2003)[3]. Hence, due to population growth and changes in the climate, the water crisis in non-humid regions will be exacerbated.

In the case of Pakistan, its water crisis is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. Whereas in 1951 Pakistan’s per capita water availability was 5,300 m³, it is now expected to drop to 850 m³ by 2013. This trend is mainly due to the jump in population from 34 million in 1951 to the projected 207 million in 2013. A six factor increase in population in 62 years has obvious ramifications for per capita water availability. The outcome is presented in Table 1[4].

Table 1:  Past, present and future water availability per capita per year in Pakistan

Year	Population (million)	Per capita Availability (m3)
1951	34	5300
1961	46	3950
1971	65	2700
1981	84	2100
1991	115	1600
2000	148	1200
2013	207	850
2025	267	659

Source: Draft State of Environment Report 2005

Pakistan’s current water scarcity becomes an even greater concern when we look at the degree of control over water sources and the percentage of renewable water usage. These indicators put additional stress that is over and above of the already identified level of water stress or scarcity in the country. As presented in Figure 1[5], 75% or more of Pakistan’s accessible surface water originates from outside its borders from Indian controlled territory. Considering the political hostility between the two states, this dependence on an outside source leaves Pakistan even more vulnerable.  Pakistan’s case is further exacerbated when observing[6] that its use of water as percentage of total renewable surface water resources is more than 75% (Figure 2). This high rank in the water exploitation index places Pakistan as a severely water stressed country.

Figure 1. 

Figure 2.

Besides establishing water stress through the water availability per capita per year indicator, there is also a need for an additional indicator that can capture the irrigation water requirements and availability in countries where the agricultural sector predominates in water consumption.  In the South Asian sub-continent, the agricultural sectors of Nepal, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh use 99%, 97%, 92% and 86% of total water available, respectively. Thus, in order to obtain a better representation of whether water supply meets demand, it is perhaps best to supplement the existing criteria of judging water scarcity with others for a fuller picture of the causes of the prevailing water crisis in the region.

Table 2.  Historical Canal Water Diversions in the Indus Basin of Pakistan[7]

Key Influences	Period	Canal Diversions MAF / (billion m3)
		Kharif	Rabi	Annual
Pre – Partition	1940-1947	47.6/ (58.5)	20.2/ (24.9)	67.8/ (83.4)
Partition	1947-1948	46.3/ (57.0)	22.4/ (27.6)	68.8/ (84.6)
Dispute	1948-1960	51.5/ (63.4)	24.7/ (30.4)	76.3/ (93.8)
Pre – Mangla	1960-1967	60.3/ (74.2)	27.6/ (34.0)	88.0 / (108.2)
Post – Mangla	1967-1975	65.3/ (80.3)	30.2 (37.1)	95.5 (117.4)
Post – Tarbela	1975-1980	68.1/ (83.7)	38.2/ (47.0)	106.3 / (130.7)
Post – Tarbela	1980-1985	68.4/ (84.1)	37.3/ (45.9)	105.7 (130.0)
Post – Tarbela	1985-1990	66.3/ (81.6)	37.7/ (46.4)	104.1/ (128.0)
Post – Tarbela	1990-1995	66.3/ (81.5)	38.5/ (47.3)	104.7/ (128.8)
Post – Tarbela	1975-1995	67.2 (82.7)	38.0 (46.7)	105.2/ (129.4)

Data Source: Water Resources Management Directorate, WAPDA.

Based on meteorological data from 18 stations country-wide, annual potential evapo-transpiration[8] varies from 1.20 m in Muree to 2.0 m in Jackababad.  Similar estimates of irrigation requirements are made for each province of Pakistan. When we compare these annual irrigation requirements, based on areas irrigated, we observe, as shown in Table 3, another dimension of the water crisis. Since water usage in the agricultural sector in Pakistan is around 97%, scarcity in water supply would have critical ramifications for food security and the livelihood of the people. Setting aside whatever pretext, inequitable water distribution per unit irrigated area is bound to effect food security in the country. For example, if Punjab that produces almost 80% of agricultural production, overall seasonal water deficit of 0.64 m per unit area irrigated is expected to have a negative impact on productivity and consequently it could put food security at risk.

   Table 3. Comparison of Surface water allocations and Water Requirements among four Provinces of Pakistan

Description	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Baluchistan
Annual Irrigation Requirements (m)	1.26	1.34	1.16	1.19
Annual Water Allocation as per 1991 Accord in BCM (MAF)	68.81 (55.94)	59.98 (48.76)	10. 80 (8.78)	4.76 (3.87)
Canal  Irrigated  Areas (million hectares) in 2000-03	11.04	1.96	0.77	0.55
Annual water allocated per unit area irrigated (m)	0.62	3.06	1.40	0.87
Deficit (-) or Surplus (+) in m/ha	-0.64	+ 1.72	+ 0.24	-0.32

The 11.04 million hectare canal commanded area in Punjab constitutes 77% of the entire irrigated area of the country. The same ratio applies for the cropped areas that are irrigated exclusively either by tube-wells or wells. Shortage of more than half of the required irrigation water has resulted in deficit irrigation causing serious productivity concerns. This crisis is brought on by neither nature, nor by India; rather, it is home-made and we have no options but to find ways and means to face it off.

Due to the severe water shortages as presented in the table above, tube-well irrigation has seen an exponential growth in the last 50 years. Recent data suggests that over 1.2 million tube-wells are installed in the country and more than one million of these are pumping about 35 MAF of groundwater just in Punjab to irrigate 2.74 million hectares exclusively as well as 7.17 million hectares conjunctively with canals. Without getting into arguments and counter-arguments, these figures themselves illustrate the clear and solid ground reality of the huge water crisis in the food granary of Pakistan. It is interesting to note the extent of dependence of Punjab on ground water as 71.1% of its irrigated region relies either exclusively on tube-wells, or on tube-wells in conjunction with surface water (canals). In contrast to Punjab, the share of tube-well irrigation in other provinces is almost insignificant.

On one hand, dependence on groundwater in Punjab is a blessing as the quantity being used is almost three times that of Pakistan’s surface water storage capacity. Moreover, this explosion of pumping technology helps to control the twin menace of water-logging and salinity in this region. In spite of the fact that in many areas, groundwater extractions have surpassed the surface water recharge to aquifer, the availability of even the diminishing groundwater storage is resource of great importance. Just try to imagine the severity of the current water crisis in a scenario where there was no groundwater available; it would have been a flabbergasting and horrifying outcome.

On the other hand, this practice of delaying the fatal impact of a water crisis has put the entire sustainability of irrigated Punjab at risk. The insane absence of an institutional support system for groundwater management as well as the shortage of canal water has forced farmers of Punjab to use groundwater where almost two-thirds of the tube-wells are pumping sodic water for irrigation. As farmers are left to decide on their own where to install tube-wells for groundwater extraction, they rely on a simple taste test to avoid pumping brackish water but continue to pump sodic/alkaline waters that a simple taste cannot help them avoid. This is why more than two-thirds of the tube-wells in Punjab are slowly adding poison to irrigated lands, which has become a significant factor for low yields in this region. This is another aspect of the seriousness of the emerging colossal water crisis.

At present, our entire focus during this crisis is confined to either blaming India for stealing water or debating the building of the Kala-Bagh dam. Though these considerations are important, should we opt a destructive way of war where there will be no winners or should we look at the options that are still available to us to overcome this crisis? Obviously, war is not a viable option, period.

To seek a constructive way out, we need to ask ourselves an honest question: At present, are we really in a position to abrogate the Indus Water Treaty and get even a half way decent agreement from an extremely hostile neighbor? Of course not! Since the Indus river systems became a trans-boundary flow case after the partition in 1947, we could have convinced India and the international community at large to follow international laws regarding the established water rights for lower riparian. Instead, we were forced to negotiate and accept the partition of the Indus valley and Indus river waters. In other words, we agreed to the law of the jungle, might is right, instead of taking the right stand based on relevant international law on established water rights.

Indeed, during the British era, the entire canal irrigation system was designed, planned and implemented on the cardinal principle of equitable river water “disposal”/distribution per unit of irrigated area in the Indus Valley. Interestingly enough, in this intra-national context, our negotiations among four provinces revolved around the prevailing international water laws to satisfy established water rights because of inundation canals under the lower riparian scenario. This happened in spite of the fact that inundation canal disappeared with appearance of weir controlled facilities like Sukkur barrage in 1932 and distribution of 97% of water for irrigated agriculture equitably on commanded area basis. Although there were many other additional drastic changes on ground like say the independence, formation of one unit and signing of the Indus water treaty of 1960; once an agreement is signed with consensus, it should be accepted whole heartedly. As a matter of fact, we should still feel fortunate enough that all provinces signed on the Water Apportionment Accord in 1991. This brings us to ask ourselves one more honest question: Without endangering the entire fabric of our federation, is there any possibility to get a better water apportionment accord among our four provinces? The answer is obvious: a big NO.

In spite of the above two soul-searching questions and their candid answers, the fact remains that both of these agreements have had a huge impact on the on-going water crisis. In both cases, an honest perusal would reveal that the stake-holders of these agreements remain faithful to them only in letter, not spirit.” If these agreements are our best viable options, we can have a way out of this crisis only if we create conditions that make all the stake-holders implement and follow them in both letter and spirit.

For example, India is allowed to develop hydro-power potential by constructing dams as long as they stay within the run-of-the-river principle. If India tries to deviate, we try to negotiate, and failing that, we seek arbitration from a neutral expert by using the good offices of the World Bank. Case in point is the arbitration on Buglihar Dam. Though the conclusion of the mediation required India to make minor adjustments to its design, it did not prohibit India from continuing to build dams across all three western rivers allocated for supplying Pakistan with water, as long as these power generation facilities confined their design to run-of-the-river flows.

However, in doing so, India is developing a capacity and capability to flood Pakistan when water demand for crops is the least, and exacerbate drought conditions when there is a dire need for crops in the Indus Valley of Pakistan. Since we do not have observers stationed at all such dam and control sites, India can start storage where there is very little rain or glacier water availability. A delay of well-coordinated water stoppage for even a few weeks can ruin our agricultural economy to a great extent. Similarly, when there is not much need for crops, as in during the wet season, India can flood the country to cause further damage to the economy. This risk is further enhanced with the acceptance of sluice gates to remove slit by the neutral expert appointed by the World Bank while arbitrating on the Baglihar dam case. As India employs these manipulations of water supply, it can hide behind the letter sense of the Indus Water Treaty. For Pakistan, however, the water crisis will go from bad to worse as time goes by.

If we turn to the domestic level, we have created problems for ourselves by ignoring the basic principle of design for equitable river water disposal on irrigated area basis, but started deviating from this basic principle just to establish rights for additional water use by increasing water allowances in canal commands. Like the famous gold rush in the US, just to establish water rights, all provinces tried to increase water allowances either by developing new irrigation systems or widening the existing facilities by authorizing and pushing more water than the original design of conveyance systems. This has caused rivalries and hot exchanges among provinces and stakeholders. Moreover, different lobbies used such deviations to seek political benefits by justifying extra water needs over and above the original water allowances.

Due to an absence of proper water management at the secondary canal level, a water crisis is very evident—particularly at the lower parts of these canals. This poor management along with the usage of flood irrigation (either irrigation by flooding basins or using the old Punchoo system) is hastening the intensity of the water crisis day by day. IRSA or no IRSA, telemetry system or no telemetry system—unless we decide to distribute water by going beyond the strict letter of the agreement and include the spirit of the Water Apportionment Accord of 1991, we will not see an end of this water crisis in Pakistan.

In order to face this serious, emerging threat to our main living source, we have to revisit our perceptions and self-righteous claims regarding the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 and the Water Apportionment Accord of 1991. If all stakeholders honestly decide to follow these agreements in both letter and spirit, instead of getting caught up arguing over the legal language of the treaties, there still exists a real hope to face off such a crisis effectively. However, if we keep focusing on maintaining appearances of abiding the letter of these historical commitments, I am afraid that its potential consequences could be disastrous for all concerned. We need to move beyond blowing fire to get our self-claimed and perceived rights and show courage to openly take steps to shoulder relevant responsibilities both in letter and spirit. With that kind of stated paradigm shift, I am sure that there is nothing that we cannot manage and face.

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[1] Retrived from: “hhtp:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/water crisis”

[2] Senator M. Amin Dadabhoy. 2003. World Water Crisis and Pakistan. Article published in the Dawn of 24^th November 2003.

[3] Same source as given under Reference No. 3.

[4] WWF-Pakistan. 2007. A Special Report: Pakistan’s Waters at Risk. Published by WWF-Pakistan, Ferozepur Road, Lahore, Pakistan

[5] Tie Lee Huu and Hotomi Rankine. 2007. The Future of Forests in Asia and Pacific:Outlook for 2020. UN Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Ching Mai, Thailand.

[6] Second figure that follows is also copied from the same source as under Reference No.6.

[7] Hafeez Akhtar Randhawa. 2001. Water Development for Irrigated Agriculture in Pakistan: Past Trends, Returns and Future Requirements. FAO’s Regional Consultation on Investment in Landand water. 3-5 October, 2001, Bangkok, Thailand.

[8] George H. Hargreaves and Zohrab A. Samani. 1986. World Water for Agriculture. International Irrigation center, Utah State University, Logan, Utah.