Root Cause of Water Crisis: Post #27

Variable Seasonal River Flows

The root cause of water crisis in Pakistan lies in the extreme seasonal variations in river flows. During the summer, the rivers dump almost 85 % of total annual volume of river water creating havoc of floods everywhere in the country. As consequence, the remaining 15% river water supplies in the winter are too little to keep all provinces satisfied. Either way, it creates a no win situation for the national economy. Thus it is the timing of water availability and the inability to modulate this which causes the water crisis.

 

Whereas the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 and then the Water Apportionment Accord of 1991 would have provided us solid institutional foundations to build on, we are unfortunately stuck in a vicious cycle of blame games that has no end in the sight. As a matter of fact, such a negative attribute has become so much ingrained in our psyche that it deprives us doing our own homework to deal with the severe water crisis already on hand.

Whether the referred water agreements were good or bad, they are there as a part of our history. Now, we need, as a civilized nation, not only to learn to live with them but also make the best use of those strategic decisions. Instead of always blaming each other and outsiders, we should challenge the collective wisdom of all expert- resources to find alternative favorable ways out.

Even a foreign water expert like John Briscoe, a professor at Harvard and a former adviser to the World Bank, considers that the issue of water is not just an issue but an existential issue for Pakistan. On the other hand, it is depressing to note, we are bent upon keeping this a mere political issue that is only being used to strengthen respective vote banks of different stakeholders.

In a politically charged and polarized environment, it is safer to report what is wrong but not so safe to suggest unbiased and apolitical corrective measures. This has to change in view of the existential nature of the water issue in Pakistan. In the stated spirit and context, let us consider some potential means to minimize the differences in the seasonal river flows being the root cause of water crisis.

First step in this direction is the one that John Briscoe also alluded to in his article titled “War and Peace on the Indus (2010).”  He discussed the abnormal circumstances at the time of negotiating the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) that made Pakistan to put stringent and specific storage limits and riders like the term “run-of-the-river” only to ensure that Pakistan gets the entire quantity of the three allocated western rivers without any change of flows.  In a bracket, he even fancied a rosy picture by stating: “In an even more ideal world, India could increase low-flows during the critical planting season, with significant benefit to Pakistani farmers and with very small impacts on power generation in India.”  However, he left the details to be worked out by the direct stakeholders.

Because of Pakistan’s lackluster preparation and performance while presenting its case of the Baglihar Dam before the arbitration court, the decision to allow gates for silt-removal is equivalent to reinterpretation of the Treaty where physical limitations were over-ruled by neutral expert. This has allowed India to manipulate the timing of the river flows like she did while filling the Baglihar Dam during a critical planting time in Pakistan. With dozens of dams already in the pipeline and many more to come, it paints a very bleak picture for Pakistan if India wishes to manipulate the timing of the river flows.

However, instead of ruing the opportunity we missed, we need to deliberate on the ways and means to ask for review or while seeking arbitration for the multiple new hydro-power projects; we should seek remedial measures for the potential capacity created to manipulate flows by India after the reinterpretation of the Treaty by the referred decision of the arbitration court. Since India has already misused this decision by filling the dam at a wrong time and hurt Pakistan, we should now insist on having Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) put in place for filling and emptying of such dams.

Either on bilateral basis or through arbitration, if SOPs are agreed, it will present a win-win situation for both the countries: India can avoid un-necessary legal battles and Pakistan gets benefited from increased flows during planting seasons from so many hydro-power dams upstream. Obviously, the filling of these dams will have to be during wet-season.

All the stated legal hassle can be set aside if India decides to follow the foot-prints of Brazilian Prsident, Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, who generously looked after the complaints of smaller neighbors like Paraguay and Bolivia or chooses a adopts a statesmanship like role like Nelson Mandela as proposed by John Briscoe in his article. However, in view of our not-so-enviable past history, we know for sure that nothing of that sort can be expected in the South Asian context. The best option for both states is to have the guaranteed SOPs put in place to avoid a tragic train wreck on the Indus as Briscoe phrases it on this existential issue.

The second step would be to have dams built on the three western rivers within Pakistan to take in flood- waters that are generated within our own boundaries or to counter any mischief from the upper riparian state. Since the construction of the dams requires consensus among all provinces / regions, we have to keep Kalabagh project off-the-shelf till consensus is achieved. However, since there is already consensus developed on Bhasha Dam, our focus should be to make it reality without any further delay.

With Bhasha and Tarbela dams on the Indus, we can develop significant capacity to hold the flows from the internal northern watershed areas. The raising of Mangla Dam has increased the capacity of the dam to cater additional flows of the Jhelum River too. In case of Chenab River, the only site that can hold some water is Chiniot but maximum numbers of dams being on this river are under Indian control, if the above referred SOPs are secured, the proper management of the Chenab water may not be too difficult either.

 Third step in this context is movement towards a concept of water banks that each province can be encouraged to put in place. This mechanism is essential whether we get the SOP arrangements in place or not as discussed earlier. All provinces should be encouraged to develop water banks to take in their respective due share of flood water, to conserve water when there is either rain or slack periods within irrigated zones and to allow conjunctive use of surface and groundwater. This step is critical to minimizing the impacts of seasonal variability as well as providing water when required even if the rivers are running low or dry.

The fourth step to reduce seasonal variations is by introducing better watershed governance and management. Generally, watershed governance is ignored and watershed management is viewed only for downstream benefits like reduction in floods and siltation in dams. With such an off-focus strategy on the very watersheds and their local stakeholders, there has been very little success in this context.

By ensuring willing involvement of the locals for the watershed governance and management, we stand a better chance of success. This will then lead to allow more plantations to slow down run-off, more seepage into the soil as well as increased inflows during lean periods through return flows. Such practices will also reduce risk of floods during rainy season because of the developed capacity of a watershed to take-in or delay run-off of rainy waters.

Among all the other three steps proposed, the improvement of the watershed governance and management is the easiest one to accomplish to secure maximum possible impact within the watershed as well as for downstream benefits. Moreover, this does not need heavy financial outlays, the requirement of consensus or any positive change in the hostile attitude of the upper riparian state.